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In the present research, I introduce a new type of means under goal systems theory 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002):  a costly means, which is instrumental to a focal goal but 
detrimental to alternative goal(s).  An attributional inference similar to the augmentation 
effect (Kelley, 1971) may occur for costly means, suggesting that because they are 
detrimental to alternative goal(s), they must be especially instrumental to a focal goal.  
Moreover, individuals under high (vs. low) commitment to this focal goal may perceiv  a 
costly means as less extreme.  Findings from Study 1 provide evidence for both 
hypotheses, and Study 2 showed that alternative goal primes lead to perceptions of costly 
means as more extreme.  These findings recommend the integration of rational choice 
and goal systems theories, provide evidence for the augmentation effect as a heuristic 
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The Augmentation Effect:   
When Cost Enhances the Perceived Benefit of Extreme Means 
 A starving party of travelers resorts to cannibalism in order to feed themselv s; a 
father kills his entire family after being laid off from his job; a suicide bomber kills 
innocent civilians to protest a perceived wrong against other innocent civilians.  Many 
forms of extreme behaviors, including some mentioned here, have been on the rise in 
recent years for a variety of reasons (e.g., social contagion, globalization, societal 
upheaval).  For instance, almost 90 percent of suicide attacks in the modern era of suicide 
terrorism (1981 – 2008) occurred from 2003 to 2008 (Merari, 2010).  The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security issued a 2009 report warning that right-wing extremist 
groups were stepping up their recruitment and operational capabilities in the wake of the 
2008 presidential election, immigration reform, and the economic downturn.  Twenty-
four hour news media keep extremist acts at the forefront of attention, and the 
technological innovations of the last century have made it easier for extremists to carry 
out attacks with devastating consequences.  Given the frequency, salience, and impact of 
extremist behavior in the modern world, it is essential to investigate the causal
mechanisms that may be responsible for people’s choices to carry out extreme acts.   
 While it may seem that extreme behaviors are unpredictable or pathological in 
origin, research suggests that the people who carry out these acts are surprisingly 
“normal” (Bongar, Brown, Beutler, Breckenridge, & Zimbardo, 2007; Merari, 2010; 
Post, Ali, Henderson, Shanfield, Victoroff, & Weine, 2009).  Moreover, theorists 
increasingly posit that extremist actors are rational and specifically, subjectively rational, 
given their current situation and perceptions (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006; Kruglanski & 
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Orehek, 2008; Wintrobe, 2006).  The key question for researchers is how ndividual 
actors or groups come to perceive extreme action as subjectively rational.  In other words, 
what psychological processes lead people to perceive an extreme behavior as non-
extreme, or at least sufficiently non-extreme to consider acting on?  The present esearch 
seeks to introduce and explore a behavioral economic explanation of extreme behavior 
within a goal systemic (Kruglanski et al., 2002) framework, as a function of a distorted 
cost-benefit analysis that individuals experience when they are highly committed to a 
focal goal.   
What is Extremism, and When Does it Arise? 
 In order to embark on the study of extremist behavior, it is first necessary to 
identify the key components of extremism as a construct.  Some traditional definitions 
posit that extremism is a function of norms (e.g., Wintrobe, 2006); extreme attitudes, 
cognition, and behavior would thus be those that are non-normative.  Other definitions 
state that extremism involves zeal or conviction for a given attitude or position (e.g., 
Abelson, 1995; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001).  Kruglanski and Klein 
(2009) attempted to link these two definitions, by arguing that under high commitment to 
a focal goal (i.e., zealous conviction), individuals may engage in behaviors that are costly 
to alternative pursuits.  The foregoing of these pursuits, particularly those that are valued 
by the majority of society, might render these behaviors non-normative, or extreme.  
Thus, goal commitment could be described as an antecedent of extremism, and the non-
normative nature of extremism as a consequence of its costliness to alternative pursuits.  
The single factor in this analysis that is inherent in extremism, rather than its antecedent 
or consequence, is its costliness to alternative goal pursuits.  Indeed, it is diffcult to 
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imagine an attitude or behavior that would be considered extreme that is not costly o 
some alternative goal or concern.  Therefore, I propose that cost to alternative goal 
considerations is a necessary but not sufficient component of attitudes or behavior that 
would be considered extreme.  The actual perception of a costly means as extreme would 
then depend on the degree to which the goal(s) it undermines are valued by the individual 
or group judging its extremity.  If the means is costly to alternative goals of value to the 
judging individual or group, it would be considered extreme; if, however, it is costly to 
alternative goals that are not valued by that individual or group, it would not be 
considered extreme.  So whereas not all costly means would necessarily be consid red 
extreme (i.e., those that are not costly to normative considerations), all means that might 
be considered extreme are costly.   
 To clarify this definition and hypothesized model of extremism, I approach the 
present research from a goal systemic (Kruglanski et al., 2002) perspective.  Specifically, 
an extreme attitude or behavior is necessarily a costly means to some end, i.e., one that is 
instrumental to a focal goal, but detrimental to alternative goal pursuit(s).  As an 
example, an individual who joins a cult may do so out of a desire to fulfill unmet 
belongingness needs, while foregoing the alternative goals of participation in the larger 
social world and freedom to think and act as one pleases.  Thus, joining a cult would 
constitute a costly means, as it is instrumental to a focal goal (i.e., belonging) but 
detrimental to alternatives (i.e., normative social participation, freedom).  This particular 
costly means (joining a cult) would likely be considered extreme by the largersoci ty in 
which the individual is embedded, as it is costly to goals that society values (e.g., 
participation in society).  However, this costly means would not be considered extrm  
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by the cult, as the cult members probably do not place high value on the very same 
alternative goals (e.g., participation in society at large).  Thus, the definition of a means 
as extreme is subjective or relative, dependent on the goals of the individual or group 
making the judgment.   
This relativity in the definition or perception of extremism makes objective study 
of the process leading to extremism a challenge.  However, it is possible to begin 
exploring this process by first understanding the one unchanging aspect of extremism, 
namely, that it necessarily involves a costly means.  Studying the psychological 
mechanisms that are involved when an individual perceives a costly means as more or
less extreme provides a window into the process of becoming an extremist.  One cannot 
engage in extreme action without first “rationalizing” (i.e., perceiving as rational or non-
extreme) a costly means.  Therefore, the present research explores the psychological 
mechanisms that lead one to perceive a costly means as less extreme, or more rational. 
Rational Choice and Extremism 
 The detrimentality aspect of a costly means raises an important question:  Why 
would an individual use a means that is detrimental to alternative goal pursuits, 
particularly if other means that are not detrimental to these goals are available?  Indeed, 
goal systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002) defines a multifinal means as one that will 
fulfill multiple goals at once, and it demonstrates that people take such multifinality 
considerations into account when choosing among means for goal pursuit.  For instance, 
an individual might choose to study in a group instead of alone in order to both prepare 
for her upcoming exam and socialize with classmates (Chen, 2009); or, the individual 
may choose to purchase a fitness item that also signals his identification with his 
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university (e.g., a University of Maryland water bottle) rather than a generic item without 
a school logo (Kruglanski, Chun, Sleeth-Keppler, & Friedman, 2005).  With such 
multifinal means available, particularly in more consequential situations involv g, say, a 
choice between peaceful protest and blowing up an abortion clinic, why would a costly 
means have any appeal to an actor?  The answer is twofold, and is derived from goal 
systems and rationality theories (e.g, Simon, 1978).   
 These theories suggest that people consider two critical factors when deciding 
among means for goal pursuit: expectancy and value.  According to goal systems theory 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002), which redefines the terminology of previous rationality theories 
to specify means-end relations1, the expectancy of attaining a given goal using a 
particular means is defined as the means’ instrumentality to the goal.  Thus, expectancy 
in general may be determined by the combined instrumentalities of all available means to 
the goal.  The value of a goal’s attainment for an individual might be conceptualized s 
goal importance, reflected as goal commitment (e.g., zealous conviction).  Csistent 
with Kruglanski and Klein’s (2009) theory, I argue that, due to a unique attributional 
inference known as the augmentation effect, costly means are perceived as particularly 
instrumental to the goal that they serve, which affords a high expectancy of goal 
attainment.  Therefore, under high commitment to that goal, individuals will be more 
                                                          
1  Under Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory, for instace, instrumentality is defined as a subordinate goal – 
superordinate goal relation, whereas in goal system theory it is defined as a means-goal relationship. 
Valence or value under goal systems theory would be attached to the goal in this means-goal relation, 
whereas in expectancy theory it would pertain to the superordinate or secondary goal.  Finally, expectancy 
under Vroom refers to a general effort – subordinate goal relation, similar to the notion of efficacy, whereas 
under goal systems theory expectancy is a general snse that the goal is attainable.  This attainability 
perception may be a function of the sum total instrumentalities of all means that could help to attain he 
goal.   
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likely to disregard costs to alternative goals and proceed with use of the costly means.   
Expectancy:  The augmentation effect 
 Previous theory and research suggest that an attributional phenomenon known as 
the augmentation effect may impact one’s perception of the exp ctancy of goal 
attainment using a costly means.  The augmentation effect, originally proposed by Kelley 
(1971), stated that when an inhibitory cause for an actor’s behavior is present (vs. 
absent), observers tend to attribute that behavior more strongly to whatever f cilitative 
cause is present.  As Kelley put it, observers infer that “the facilitative cause must have 
been effective, and potently so, if the effect occurred espite the opposing effect of the 
inhibitory cause” (p. 12, emphasis mine).  Later researchers refined this iea by 
suggesting that the augmentation effect implies that “given that an obstacle had to be 
overcome, whatever may have caused the effect must have been of considerable 
magnitude” (Kruglanski, Schwartz, Maides, & Hamel, 1978, p. 183).   
 Therefore, the augmentation effect in goal systemic terms deals with inferences 
about a means that an individual used to achieve a goal.  More specifically, observers 
infer that a means must have been especially instrumental (i.e., facilitative) o a focal goal 
if it allowed the actor to achieve the focal goal in spite of obstacles (i.e., inhibitory 
causes).  The augmentation effect thus describes a po t hoc inference about a means’ 
instrumentality to a focal goal, given information about the obstacles that the means 
overcame.  I propose an extension of Kelley’s (1971) original augmentation effect to 
suggest that it not only occurs as a post hoc inference, but also as an  priori inference 
about a means’ instrumentality to a focal goal.  Namely, people may infer that if a means 
is detrimental (i.e., inhibitory) to an alternative goal, then it must be especially 
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instrumental (i.e., facilitative) to the focal goal.  In other words, people may believe a 
priori that costly means are especially effective for focal goal pursuit. 
 To understand the origins of this perception of costly means’ special 
instrumentality, it is first necessary to note that goal systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 
2002) posits a connectionist model of means, goals, and their interrelations.  For instance, 
a goal and a means to that goal may be linked via a cognitive connection or association 
under a spreading activation model (e.g., Anderson, 1983).  Moreover, these connections 
between means and goals may be either facilitative or inhibitory, such that the activation 
of one leads to the activation or deactivation (respectively) of the other.  Indeed, pr vious 
research has shown that goal systems (i.e., interconnected arrays of goals and means) can 
contain both facilitative and inhibitory connections (e.g., Fishbach, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2003; Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002).  The augmentation effect 
posited in the present research operates under the assumption that an inhibitory link can 
lead to the strengthening of a facilitative link (Read & Miller, 1998). 
 Specifically, the link between a costly means and the alternative goal it 
undermines would be inhibitory; their association is negative due to the costly means’ 
detrimentality to that goal.  Likewise, the link between a costly means and the focal goal 
it serves would be facilitative; the association between them is positive due to the cos ly 
means’ instrumentality to that goal.  Under a connectionist framework, the negative or 
inhibitory association between a means and goal would leave the “energy” that mig t 
otherwise have been directed toward that path seeking an outlet.  In other words, the 
inhibitory means-goal link might cause a sort of “backlash” in spreading activation 
toward whatever facilitative paths are available, which for the costly means includes most 
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notably the link to the focal goal it serves.  Thus, the inhibitory link between the costly
means and the goal it undermines might serve to strengthen the link between the costly 
means and the focal goal it serves.  This strengthening would be reflected in perceptions 
of the costly means as particularly instrumental to the focal goal.   
Importantly, once this facilitative link to the focal goal has been strengthened, 
holding all else equal, it should maintain its strength regardless of whether the alternative 
goal is active in a given moment.  In other words, perceiving the special instrumentality 
of a costly means to a focal goal should not require simultaneous perception of its 
detrimentality to the alternative goal it undermines.  If one has perceived the costly 
means’ detrimentality to the alternative goal on a previous occasion, and this inhibitory 
link has thus strengthened the facilitative link of the costly means to the focal g al, then 
the special (perceived) instrumentality should linger whether the alternative goal is active 
or inactive.  Simply stated, goal systems under a connectionist model can “learn”, and the 
links that have been strengthened by previous perceptions or associations should remain 
strengthened for future associations or perceptions in subsequent means choice situat ons.  
This principle should apply to the a priori augmentation effect, such that once one has 
perceived a costly means’ detrimentality to an alternative goal, the costly means should in 
future instances be perceived as especially instrumental to a focal goal it serves, 
independent of whether the alternative goal and its link to the means are active. 
Value:  Focal goal commitment and alternative goal suppression 
 The augmentation effect demonstrates the appeal of a costly means in terms of its 
instrumentality to a focal goal, and thus its impact on the perceived expectancy of goal
attainment.  By use of a costly means, rather than a non-costly or less costly means, one 
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would expect a greater likelihood of attaining a focal goal.  However, a costly means is 
perceived as especially instrumental to a focal goal because of its detr mentality to 
alternatives, and those alternative goal considerations do not magically disappear 
whenever the augmentation effect occurs.  In other words, the augmentation effect does 
not explain when or why people might disregard alternative goal considerations and 
choose to use a costly means for goal pursuit.  The missing piece of this puzzle is the 
remaining component of rational choice models: goal value.  
 Previous research has shown that people who are highly committed to a focal goal 
tend to suppress or inhibit alternative goals (Kopetz, Faber, Fishbach, & Kruglanski, in 
press; Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002).  In other words, the cognitive 
representations of alternative goals are less readily accessible or active for the individual 
under high focal goal commitment.  For such a highly committed individual, the 
alternative goal or multifinality constraints that might make a costly means seem less 
appealing than a multifinal means are no longer present.  Those alternative go ls are 
suppressed, and the multifinality constraints are relaxed, so that the individual is free to 
choose any means that will enable him to attain the focal goal.  With such freedom from 
alternative goal considerations, and with the augmentation effect suggesting that a costly 
means is the most effective for focal goal pursuit2, the question becomes why wouldn’t an 
individual choose the costly means for goal pursuit? 
 As an illustrative example, consider the would-be suicide bomber.  One potential 
                                                          
2 Recall that the augmentation effect should occur rega dless of whether the alternative goal is active, du  
to the “learning” capabilities of connectionist goal systems.  Therefore, the suppression or inhibition of the 
alternative goal and its inhibitory link to the costly means should not prevent one from perceiving the costly 
means as especially instrumental to the focal goal, s  long as that connection was previously strengthened. 
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recruit may believe that suicide terrorism is an especially effective way to obtain honor 
(e.g., as a martyr), but he might still view suicide terrorism as extreme or irrational if he 
cares as much about human rights or self-preservation as he cares about obtaining honor.  
However, for another potential recruit who is zealously committed to obtaining honor 
(for instance, because he shamed his family in the community), human rights and self-
preservation concerns would be suppressed, and he may carry out a costly act of suicide 
terror in an attempt to obtain his all-important honor goal.  Therefore, for those who are 
highly committed to a focal goal, what was extreme may now be perceived as non-
extreme, what was irrational may become rational, and what would have been out of the 
question may now be seen as the optimal strategy.  The present research will tackle three 
components of this hypothesis:  a) the augmentation effect in perceptions of means’
instrumentality to a focal goal, b) distorted perceptions of a costly means’ rationality 
under high (vs. low) focal goal commitment via an a priori augmentation effect, and c) 
preference for costly (vs. unifinal or multifinal) means under high (vs. low) focal goal 
commitment.   
Method 
Study 1 
 Thus far, goal systems researchers have only examined unifinal and multifinal 
means, which are defined in terms of the instrumentality of means to focal and alter ative 
goals (Kopetz et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2007).  This study examined the new dimension 
of detrimentality by adding a costly means, defined as a means which is instrumen al to 
the focal goal but detrimental to alternative goals.  Specifically, I examined whether an 
augmentation effect occurs when a means is detrimental to alternative goals, such that 
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regardless of their commitment to the focal goal, people perceive costly means as more 
instrumental to the focal goal than either unifinal or multifinal means.   Hypothesis 1a 
predicted the augmentation effect for participants’ own perceptions of the means, while 
Hypothesis 1b predicted that participants would indicate another individual might also 
display the augmentation effect. 
 This study also explored the idea that under heightened focal goal commitment, 
people prefer a costly means, due to the perception of the costly means as highly 
instrumental to the focal goal (i.e., the augmentation effect).  Hypothesis 2 predicted an 
interaction between focal goal commitment and means type, such that participants under 
high focal goal commitment would perceive the costly means as more rational or less 
extreme than either the unifinal or multifinal means, whereas participants under low focal 
goal commitment would perceive the costly means as less rational or more extreme than 
either the unifinal or multifinal means.  Hypothesis 3 predicted that perceptions of the 
costly means as highly instrumental to the focal goal would mediate the causal 
relationship between high (vs. low) focal goal commitment and perception of costly 
means as more rational or less extreme than unifinal or multifinal means. 
 Furthermore, this study examined how focal goal commitment impacts the 
behavioral intentions of participants, such that they express intent to utilize a particular 
means among the means set and willingness to incur more cost for this means than for the 
other two.  Hypothesis 4 predicted that participants in the high (vs. low) focal goal 
commitment condition would express more intent to utilize the costly (vs. unifinal or 
multifinal) means.  Hypothesis 5 predicted that participants in the high (vs. low) focal 
goal commitment condition would express willingness to pay more money for the cosly 
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(vs. unifinal or multifinal) means. 
 Participants.  I recruited 262 participants from an undergraduate social 
psychology course at the University of Maryland.  They received extra course credit for 
participating. 
 Procedure and design.  This study was conducted in a lecture hall using paper 
and pencil surveys.  Participants were told that the study was investigating how people 
with different personality types make judgments.  The study used a 2 (Focal Goal 
Commitment:  High vs. Low) x 3 (Means Type:  Unifinal, Multifinal, Costly) x 3 (Means 
Order) x 3 (Measure Order) mixed design, where Focal Goal Commitment represented a 
between-participants factor, Means Type a within-participants factor, and Means Order 
and Measure Order represented between-participants counterbalancing factors.  
 After obtaining informed consent, I first presented participants with a fabricated 
excerpt from an article describing a study conducted by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention [CDC].  The article presented the study’s results for three medications 
(i.e., means) that were each “sufficiently effective” in treating an illness (i.e., the focal 
goal):  a) a unifinal medication, b) a multifinal medication, and c) a costly medication.  
The article presented the unifinal means with only the preceding informatin about the 
focal goal.  The multifinal means was presented with the focal goal informati n and also 
indicated that the medication was cheap and easy to obtain (i.e., instrumental to two 
alternative goals).  The costly means was presented with the focal goal information and 
also indicated that the medication was expensive and difficult to obtain (i.e., detrimental 
to two alternative goals).   
 Therefore, the three goals indicated in the study were a) treating a focal illness 
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(i.e., the focal goal), b) monetary cost-effectiveness, and c) ease of obtainment.  Th  
unifinal medication was instrumental to the focal goal and unrelated to the alternative 
goals; the multifinal medication was instrumental to all three goals; and the costly 
medication was instrumental to the focal goal but detrimental to the alternativ  goals.  
The order of presentation of the means was counterbalanced to control for order effects.  
Also, the labels for the means were novel and similar in connotation, so that prior 
experience with the means or their labels would not influence perceptions of their 
rationality or instrumentality. 
 The study was conducted during the month immediately following the outbreak of 
swine flu in late April of 2009.  Participants in the high focal goal commitment conditi  
received an article that described medications to treat the swine flu, whereas participants 
in the low focal goal commitment condition received an article that described 
medications to treat the common cold.  Presumably, the threat of contracting the swine 
flu outweighed the threat of contracting the common cold due to the recent media 
coverage of the outbreak; therefore, the swine flu article was designed to induce high 
commitment to fighting the focal illness, whereas the common cold article ostensibly 
induced relatively lower commitment to the same focal goal. 
 Participants then completed three measures, which were counterbalanced to 
control for order effects.  The first measured the perceived rationality or extremity of 
each means; participants rated each medication on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  Perceived rationality/extremity items included “Taking 
[medication] would be extreme”, “Taking [medication] would be reasonable”, “It would 
be irrational to take [medication]”, and “It would make sense to take [medication]”.  The 
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reliability coefficients of these measures ranged from .81 to .87 for the four items 
concerning each medication. 
 The second measure tapped the perceived instrumentality of each means to the 
focal goal, from the perspective of a highly committed protagonist.  Participants re d the 
following:  “Pat just came down with [Swine Flu/the common cold], and is participating 
in a follow-up study on each of the medications listed above.  In this study, Pat has a 
choice about which medication to take to combat the [flu virus/common cold].”  
Participants then indicated how effective (i.e., instrumental) Pat probably thought each 
medication was to treating either the flu or the common cold, on a 7-point scale from 1 
(Not at all effective) to 7 (Highly effective). 
 The third measure concerned the participants’ perceptions of the instrumentality 
of each means to the focal goal and their behavioral intentions to utilize a particular 
medication over and above the others.  Participants were asked to imagine that they ve 
just come down with either swine flu or the common cold, and must now choose to take 
one of the medications in the study to combat the illness.  They were then asked to 
indicate how effective (i.e., instrumental) they thought each medication would be to 
treating either the flu or the common cold, on a 7-point scale from 1 (Not at all effective) 
to 7 (Highly effective).  Next, participants were asked how much money they would be 
willing to pay for each of the medications.  They were then asked to indicate which one 
of the medications they would choose to fight their illness and to write their reasons for 
choosing that medication. 
 Finally, participants completed a series of questionnaires:  a) the Positive Affect 
Negative Affect Scale [PANAS] (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), b) the Locomotin 
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and Assessment Questionnaires (Kruglanski et al., 2000), c) the Need for Closure Scale 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), and c) a demographic survey including gender, year in 
school, age, religious affiliation, political orientation, and race.  At the end, partici nts 
were fully debriefed as to the nature and purpose of the study. 
 Results.  A 2 (commitment) x 3 (means type) x 3 (means order) x 3 (measure 
order) mixed analysis of variance was conducted on perceptions of means efficacy.  Only 
a significant main effect for means type emerged; the costly means was perceived as 
more effective at treating the illness than the other two means, Λ = .64, F(2,243) = 67.34, 
p < .01, partial η² = .36.  Hypothesis 1a was supported (see Figure 1).   
 A 2 (commitment) x 3 (means type) x 3 (means order) x 3 (measure order) mixed 
analysis of variance was conducted on participants’ ratings of a third party’s perceptions 
of means efficacy.  A significant means type x means order interaction emerged, Λ = .93, 
F(4,486) = 4.37, p < .01, partial η² = .04. 3  Pairwise comparisons revealed that the costly 
means was rated in all three means order conditions as more effective than the unifinal (p 
< .01) and multifinal (p < .01) means.  Hypothesis 1b was supported. 
 A 2 (commitment) x 3 (means type) x 3 (means order) x 3 (measure order) mixed 
analysis of variance was conducted on perceptions of means rationality4.  A significant 
commitment x means type interaction emerged, Λ = .96, F(2, 243) = 5.00, p < .01.  I ran 
pairwise comparisons to examine two separate hypotheses about costly means:  a) their 
                                                          
3 In two means order conditions, the unifinal and multifinal means were rated as equally effective (p = .61, 
1.00).  However, when the multifinal means was presented first, participants rated the multifinal means s 
more effective than the unifinal means (p < .01).   
4 Two significant higher-order interactions emerged with counterbalancing factors for perceptions of 
rationality, but the pattern of results described above was consistent in the majority of counterbalancing 
conditions and held when collapsed across levels of the counterbalancing factors. 
16 
 
perceived rationality relative to the other means types (unifinal and multifinal), a d b) 
their perceived rationality under high vs. low focal goal commitment.  As to the former, 
pairwise comparisons showed that the costly means was perceived as the least rational (or 
most extreme) of the three means types, followed by the unifinal, followed by the 
multifinal, (ps < .01).  This order of means rationality/extremity materialized in both the 
high and low commitment conditions.  As to the latter hypothesis, pairwise comparisons 
revealed that the costly means was perceived as more rational in the high (vs. low) 
commitment condition (p < .01).  The commitment manipulation did not impact 
perceptions of the unifinal or multifinal medications.  Hypothesis 2 was not supported as 
stated, but a different and meaningful pattern emerged in the data (see Figure 2).  
Specifically, the costly means was always perceived as the least rational or most extreme 
of the three means types, supporting Klein and Kruglanski’s (2009) definition of extrem  
means as necessarily costly.  However, the costly means was perceived as morerational 
when participants were under high (vs. low) commitment to the focal goal, supporting the 
notion that focal goal commitment impacts the perceived extremity of costly means. 
 Concerning Hypothesis 3, the commitment manipulation did not have a 
significant impact on the mediator (i.e., perceived effectiveness of the costly means).  
Because establishing the effect of the independent variable on the mediator is necessary 
in order to show mediation, and I failed to find this effect, I did not continue with the 
remaining mediation tests.  Thus, hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
 A chi-square analysis demonstrated that the commitment manipulation had a 
significant impact on medication choice, Χ²(1, N = 257) = 4.19, p < .05.  Whereas 
participants were overall more likely to choose the multifinal medication, thoseunder 
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high (vs. low) commitment were more likely to choose the costly medication.  (Note:  
Unifinal medications were excluded from this analysis, as only 4 participants chose this 
medication.)  Hypothesis 4 was partially supported (see Figure 3); while participants did 
not prefer the costly means over the other means types under high commitment (in fact,
the opposite was true for multifinal means), they were more likely to choose the costly 
means under high (vs. low) commitment to the focal goal. 
 A 2 (commitment) x 3 (means type) x 3 (means order) x 3 (measure order) mixed 
analysis of variance was conducted on the amount of money participants indicated that 
they were willing to pay for each medication.  A significant means type x commitment 
interaction emerged, Λ = .97, F(2, 242) = 4.27, p = .02, partial η2 = .03.  Pairwise 
comparisons using Bonferroni corrections revealed that participants would be willing to 
pay more money for all three medications under high (vs. low) commitment (p < .01 for 
all medications).  Further pairwise comparisons showed that in the high commitment 
condition, participants were willing to pay more for the costly medication than for eithe  
the unifinal or multifinal medication (p < .01 for both comparisons).  However, in the low 
commitment condition, the amounts that participants were willing to pay for each 
medication did not differ significantly across medications (p > .13 for all comparisons).  
Thus, Hypothesis 5 was supported. 
 Finally, in an exploratory analysis, I used AMOS to test a structural model of the 
impact of commitment on medication choice, with perceptions of the rationality of the 
costly means entered as a mediator, and with perceptions of the multifinal means’ 
rationality entered only as a predictor of choice (see Figure 4).  The model sh wn in 
Figure 4 fit the data well, χ²(3, N = 257) = 1.504, p = .68.  Other indices showed excellent 
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fit, CFI = 1.000, IFI = 1.018, NFI = .982, RSMEA < .001.  Specifically, those under high 
(vs. low) commitment to the focal goal perceived the costly means as more rati nal, and 
this costly means rationality perception mediated the impact of commitment on choice of 
costly means.   
 Discussion.  The results support a goal commitment model of rational choice, 
such that individuals generally perceive costly means as most instrumental to a focal 
goal, but those under high (vs. low) commitment to that focal goal are more likely to 
actually choose the costly means.  This effect occurs via perceptions of costly means as 
more rational (or less extreme) under high (vs. low) focal goal commitment.  These 
findings are also consistent with traditional expectancy models of rational choice 
(Vroom, 1964) and thus provide some concrete evidence that people’s judgments do 
adhere to expectancy model principles. While these findings are encouraging, several 
methodological limitations required improvement in subsequent studies.   
 For one, I did not include a manipulation check on focal goal commitment in 
Study 1, or a measure of commitment to alternative goals, and so these measures were 
included in Study 2.  In addition, the unifinal means’ lack of appeal to participants ws in 
some cases a design problem.  Whereas 100 participants indicated that the unifinal means 
must lie between the multifinal and costly means in its financial cost and/or difficulty of 
obtainment, 26 participants stated that there was not enough information about the 
unifinal means.  In future studies utilizing unifinal means, it will be important to add 
filler information about the unifinal means so that mere lack of information about this 
means does not confound perceptions of the unifinal means as “between” the multifinal 
and costly means. 
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 In addition, the description of the costly medication as difficult to obtain and 
expensive may have implied that the materials used for the medication were of sup rior 
quality to those in the other medications.  Of the 90 people who chose the costly 
medication, 14 explicitly stated that they inferred that the quality or materials must be 
superior to those of the other medications.  The idea that cost implies quality is no  new 
(e.g., Olson, 1977; Rao & Monroe, 1989; Zeithaml, 1988), and could simply be one well-
known instantiation of the augmentation effect.  Future studies can determine wheth r t  
augmentation effect is unique to financial cost-effectiveness goals or applies to 
alternative goals more broadly. 
 Finally, future studies should take a multi-method approach (e.g., only one means 
evaluated, pre-post rationality ratings) in order to generalize the findings a d identify 
boundary conditions.  For instance, the effects may be unique to the specific choice 
paradigm I employed in Study 1.  Similarly, other manipulations of goal commitment 
(e.g., evaluative conditioning, physiological inducement of a drive state such as thirst, 
etc.) would allow for increased content validity on the key independent variable of goal 
commitment.  Some of these concerns will be addressed in Study 2, and others are being 
addressed in current and planned studies.  
Study 2 
 Study 2 extended and improved upon the first in several ways.  First, I used a 
different manipulation of goal commitment and included manipulation checks on the goal 
commitment variable.  Second, I included a variety of goals other than financial cost-
effectiveness, to determine whether the effects hold in other domains.  Third, instead of 
using a choice paradigm, I presented each participant with a single means that was 
20 
 
instrumental to one goal and detrimental to another goal.  I then attempted to increase 
some participants’ commitment to the instrumental goal, thus making it the focal goal, 
and activated an alternative goal to which the means was either detrimental or unrelated. 
 Participants primed with an alternative goal to which the means is detrimental (vs. 
unrelated) should rate the means as more instrumental to the focal goal.  This would 
provide further support for the augmentation effect, as associating a given means with an 
alternative goal to which it is detrimental should enhance its perceived instrumentality to 
a focal goal.  Hypothesis 6 predicted a main effect for alternative goal prime, such that 
participants would rate a means as more instrumental to a focal goal when the means was 
presented with a goal to which it was detrimental (vs. unrelated).  However, those under 
high (vs. low) focal goal commitment would perceive the means paired with a 
detrimental goal as more rational, because this costly means would likely be perceived as 
most instrumental to the goal of highest value to the individual.  Hypothesis 7 predicted 
an interaction effect of focal goal commitment and alternative goal prime on perceived 
rationality of means, such that those under high (vs. low) focal goal commitment would 
perceive the means presented with a an alternative goal to which the means was 
detrimental as more rational, whereas rationality perceptions of the means presented with 
an unrelated alternative goal would be equivalent across the two commitment conditions. 
 Participants.  I recruited 65 participants (48 women, 17 men) using an online 
participant pool at the University of Maryland. 
 Procedure and design.  In online pretesting which included several unrelated 
filler questionnaires, I asked participants to list a goal which is important to them, a 
means that is effective in reaching that goal, and two different alternative goals to which 
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the means is a) detrimental and b) unrelated.  They then rated the perceived extremity of 
using the means on a 7-point scale from 1 (Not at all extreme) to 7 (Very extreme), 
followed by the instrumentality of the means to each of the three goals on a 7-point scale 
from 1 (Very harmful) to 7 (Very helpful) with a neutral midpoint of 4 (Neither helpful 
nor harmful).  Finally, they rated the importance of each of the three goals to them 
personally on a 7-point scale from 1 (Not at all important) to 7 (Extremely important).  I 
then personalized the following in-lab procedure for the goals and means set that each 
participant provided during pretesting.  
 This study employed a 2 (Focal Goal Commitment:  High vs. Low) x 2 
(Alternative Goal Prime:  Detrimental vs. Unrelated) between-subjects design. After 
providing informed consent, participants completed the study using both paper-and-
pencil and a research lab computer.  We told participants that the project was testing 
semantic processes in various types of verbal tasks.  In order to supraliminally prime the 
alternative goal, participants first completed a lexical decision task with either 
detrimental or unrelated alternative goal words as targets.  Each trial consisted of a 
briefly presented fixation point immediately followed by a letter string (either a goal-
related word or a non-word).  Participants pressed either ‘Z’ or ‘/’ to indicate whether the 
letter string was a word or a non-word.  Next, as a manipulation of focal goal 
commitment, participants listed either a) three advantages of pursuing the focal goal and 
three disadvantages of not pursuing the focal goal in the high commitment condition, or 
b) three advantages and three disadvantages of pursuing the focal goal in the low 
commitment condition.  This technique is an adaptation of Oettingen’s (1999) mental 
contrasting procedure, and has been successfully used in previous unpublished research 
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to obtain effects predicted under increased focal goal commitment (Kopetz et al., in 
press). 
 Participants then completed a questionnaire about the means they listed in 
pretesting.  They rated how effective the means is for pursuing the focal goal, using a 9-
point scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely effective), as well as their perceptions of the 
rationality or extremity of using the means to pursue the focal goal, using the 4-item scale 
from Study 1.  I randomized the order of presentation of these two measures.  Next, 
participants rated their level of commitment to the focal and alternative goals, using a 9-
point scale from 1 (not at all committed) to 9 (extremely committed).  Finally, participants 
provided some demographic information and underwent a funneled debriefing procedure 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) to check for suspicion about the purpose of the study.  No 
participants indicated knowledge of the study’s purpose or the hypotheses. 
 Results.  Before testing the hypotheses, I conducted a 2 (Focal Goal 
Commitment) x 2 (Alternative Goal Prime) x 2 (Measure Order) ANOVA on each of the 
dependent measures (perceived means instrumentality and extremity) to determine 
whether the order in which the measures were presented should be included in the model 
used for hypothesis tests.  Both analyses revealed non-significant main effects o  measure 
order (p = .12, .49), as well as non-significant two- and three-way interactions with the 
other factors (ps ranging from .15 to .87). Therefore, I excluded measure order from the 
model used for testing the hypotheses. 
 First, I conducted a 2 (Focal Goal Commitment) x 2 (Alternative Goal Prime) 
ANOVA on means instrumentality ratings.  The interaction effect was not significant (p = 
.97); nor was the main effect of focal goal commitment (p = .10) or the main effect of 
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alternative goal prime (p = .15).  Hypothesis 6 was not supported.   
 Next, I conducted a 2 (Focal Goal Commitment) x 2 (Alternative Goal Prime) 
ANOVA on perceived means rationality ratings.  The interaction effect was not 
significant (p = .22), nor was the main effect of focal goal commitment (p = .37).  
However, results showed a significant main effect of alternative goal prime, such that 
those primed with an alternative goal to which the means was detrimental (M = 1.95, SD 
= 0.92) perceived the means as more extreme than did those primed with an alternative 
goal to which the means was unrelated (M = 1.52, SD = 0.66), F(1, 61) = 4.64, p < .05.  
Hypothesis 7 was not supported, but another interesting pattern emerged (see Figure 5), 
such that participants primed with an alternative goal to which the means was detrimental 
(vs. unrelated) perceived the means as more extreme.  Thus, it seems that while the 
priming manipulation did not operate as intended to frame the means as costly or 
unifinal, it did serve to simply prime the alternative goal, resulting in the patt rn 
described here.  
 Finally, I conducted a check on the focal goal commitment manipulation, using an 
independent t-test to examine its effect on the focal goal commitment measure.  The 
manipulation was apparently ineffective; those in the high commitment condition (M = 
8.18, SD = 1.21) indicated no more commitment to the focal goal than those in the low 
commitment condition (M = 7.88, SD = 1.21), t(63) = 1.02, p = .31.    
 Discussion.  The results of Study 2 did not generally support the hypotheses; this 
calls firstly for a reexamination of the study’s methodology.  Primarily, the focal goal 
commitment manipulation was evidently ineffective.  Participants did not differin their 
focal goal commitment ratings as a function of the commitment condition.  An 
24 
 
examination of the score distribution for the manipulation check revealed a ceiling effect;
only two participants indicated focal goal commitment below the midpoint of the scale.  
Due to this limited variability in scores and probable attenuation of any effects, I was 
reluctant to proceed with substitute hypothesis tests which entered participants’ focal goal 
commitment scores as a proxy for the ineffective commitment manipulation.  At this 
time, I cannot say definitively whether focal goal commitment would impact ratings of a 
means’ instrumentality or extremity.  Future research should involve a variety of goal 
commitment manipulation procedures to overcome these limitations and test the 
hypotheses in question.  Indeed, by asking participants to list the disadvantages of focal 
goal pursuit in the low commitment conditions, it is possible that I inadvertently primed 
the costs, or an alternative goal to which the means was detrimental!  Finding a  using 
manipulations that are independent of confounds with other relevant factors in the model 
will be critical for future studies. 
 Likewise, while the priming manipulation did not operate as intended to frame the 
means as costly or unifinal, they did serve to prime the alternative goal!  Accordingly, the 
major finding of Study 2 was that supraliminally (or consciously) priming an altern tive 
goal to which a means is detrimental (vs. unrelated) led to perceptions of the means as 
more extreme.  This effect is likely a function of several parameters, not least of which is 
alternative goal value.  The higher the value the individual ascribes to the alternative 
goal, the more extreme she should perceive a means that is detrimental to that goal.  I 
would have tested this secondary hypothesis, but again a ceiling effect was present in 
participants’ ratings of their commitment to the alternative goal in Study 2.  Only four 
participants rated their commitment to the alternative goal as below the midpoint of the 
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scale, and this range restriction may have concealed any moderation effects for 
alternative goal value.  However, future research can address this hypothesis by adjusting 
the methodology to encourage greater between-participant variability in both focal and 
alternative goal commitment.  For example, it may be more effective to ask participants 
to rate their commitment to a variety of preset goals, rather than asking them to list goals 
of their own, as they likely list the most salient or important goals first. 
General Discussion 
 In these two studies, I attempted to demonstrate an a priori augmentation effect 
and establish the conditions under which this effect impacts people’s perceptions of the 
rationality or extremity of means.  The results of Study 1 indicated that, w ile a costly 
means was generally perceived as both most effective and most extreme, under 
conditions of high (vs. low) focal goal commitment, people perceived this costly means 
as less extreme and were more likely to choose it over a less costly means.  These 
findings, which demonstrate the augmentation effect and support a rational choice model 
of preference for costly means, have significant theoretical and practical implications.   
 Most directly, Study 1 holds implications for product marketing strategies under 
conditions of high consumer commitment to a goal that the product can satisfy.  For 
instance, individuals faced with a pandemic may be more likely to choose an expensive 
medication, inferring that it will be more effective than a generic brand.  This preference 
could hold even if consumers are aware that cheaper products are also sufficiently 
effective, highlighting an ethical dilemma that marketing strategists must face, especially 
when advertising prescription drugs to vulnerable consumer populations.  However, this 
makes the present research even more valuable for the scientific community and the 
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public, if only to inform them about advertising tactics which take advantage of their goal 
commitments. 
 Theoretically, Study 1 demonstrated one instance of the hypothesized a priori 
augmentation effect, by which people infer the instrumentality of a means to a focal goal 
from its cost to alternative goals.  It also provided preliminary evidence that the value of 
a goal and the expectancy of its attainment (via use of particular means) can inter ct to 
produce perceptions of costly means as, although perhaps not optimal, at least sufficiently 
rational.  This subjective expected utility model in turn predicted participants’ behavioral 
intentions, impacting their preference and the price they were willing to pay for costly 
means.  The fact that only a minority of participants preferred the costly means does not 
indicate that these findings are trivial.  Rather, real world instances of extreme behavior 
suggest that the few who are most committed, and therefore willing to use costly means, 
are often the few who resultantly do the most considerable damage to themselves and 
others. 
 The results of Study 2 did not support my hypotheses, and therefore they did not 
provide further evidence of the augmentation effect or the impact of focal goal 
commitment on perceived means rationality.  However, the findings do suggest an 
interesting mechanism that researchers can explore in future studies, and they point to 
potential interventions which might attenuate the augmentation effect and the impact of 
focal goal commitment on willingness to use a costly means.  In particular, it seems that 
activating the alternative goal to which a costly means is detrimental may attenuate the 
augmentation effect and produce perceptions of the means as relatively extreme.  Finding 
ways to encourage such consideration of the potential negative consequences of costly
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means could be quite useful, perhaps especially for those who are highly likely to engage
in risk-taking behavior or to experience intense emotions which could heighten their goal 
commitments. 
 For example, scholars who explore the aforementioned phenomenon of suicide 
terrorism have noted intriguing patterns in the retrospective affective and cog itive 
narratives of those who hesitated or prematurely aborted their mission.  In one 
memorable instance documented by Pedahzur (2005), a suicide bomber recounts his last-
minute reconsiderations of the act he was only moments from committing:   
He approached the crowd and had moved his hand to the activation button of the 
explosives belt when, suddenly, he froze.  In a statement which he later gave, he 
said that he suddenly was overcome with fear.  ‘I was afraid.  I was flooded with 
thoughts of my mother and brothers.  I decided not to blow myself up with all 
these people.  I felt sorry for them.  They did nothing wrong.’  Later, he added 
that he saw some Arab faces in the crowd and was afraid that he would harm them 
as well.  Scared and confused, Murad fled the scene.  (p. 157) 
This and a plethora of similar anecdotal evidence (e.g., Merari, 2010) suggest that the 
cognitive processes demonstrated in Study 2 are not limited to the laboratory, but also 
occur in real-world instances of extreme acts of suicide terror.  Moreover, alternative goal 
considerations, such as family and protection of one’s in-group or civilians, are 
sometimes quite successful (even at the last moment) in altering perceptions of, a d 
ultimately deterring, extreme acts. 
Future Directions 
 The present research suggests that the level of processing of the alternative goal 
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may impact the emergence of the augmentation effect, and resultant distorte  perceptions 
of a costly means’ extremity.  The alternative goals in both studies were pres nted to 
participants at a conscious level.  In Study 1, the alternative goals’ relation to the means 
were stated outright as part of a vignette; likewise, the alternative goal in Study 2 was 
primed supraliminally, meaning that the participants were able to perceive and process 
the goal-related word at a conscious level.  Under such conscious processing of the 
alternative goal, participants would have had the ability to “reason past” the 
augmentation effect in evaluating the costly means, thus perceiving it as no more 
instrumental to the focal goal than a unifinal or multifinal means.  Moreover, in Study 2, 
they likely had the motivation to reason beyond the augmentation effect in evaluating the 
costly means, as all but four participants were highly committed to the alternativ  goal.  
In Study 1, I did not obtain measures of participants’ commitment to the alternativ  goals, 
and so I cannot draw conclusions about the role of motivation in the emergence of the 
augmentation effect here.  However, it is conceivable that Study 1 participants who cared 
more about saving money or time did not succumb to the augmentation effect.  Future 
research can test this idea more explicitly. 
 If the level of processing does, in fact, impact the emergence of the augmentation 
effect in the predicted manner, then it may be appropriate to think of the augmentation 
effect as a sort of heuristic in judgment and choice.  People use heuristics most often 
when operating under limited resources (e.g., cognitive capacity, information, etc.) or 
motivation (e.g., need for closure) to fully process information relevant to their 
impending judgment or choice (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, in press).  If the augmentation 
effect operates as a heuristic, then people may only perceive costly means as especially 
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effective when they are unable or unmotivated to process relevant information beyond the 
augmentation effect.  This hypothesis should be relatively simple to test in future 
research, for instance, by introducing a simultaneous task which draws on available 
cognitive resources, or inducing time pressure or activating a previously learned 
preference for costly means, in order to sap the individual’s motivation to thoroughly 
process relevant information about that means’ detrimentality to alternative goals.   
 Similarly, future research could more directly investigate the roles f alternative 
goal value and activation in the augmentation effect, as well as exploring these two 
constructs’ potential moderating effects on the relationship between focal goal 
commitment and perceived means extremity.  Specifically, it would be interesting to 
examine traditional lexical decision measures of alternative goal suppresion, as well as 
affective priming measures of alternative goal value, to see whether eit  or both are 
impacted by heightened focal goal commitment.  By understanding the roles of 
alternative goal activation and value in perceptions of means extremity, authorities can 
devise methods of deterring extreme action by making particular costs salient to potential 
extremists.   
Conclusion 
 This research tested a rational choice model that included the critical dimensions 
of instrumentality (i.e., expectancy) and goal commitment (i.e., value), and itmay 
provide a fresh perspective on some of the long-dormant theories of extremism.  Pending 
further studies which confirm the basic processes across multiple methods and goals-
means domains, these results have the potential to generalize to pressing real-world 
situations, such as that of the aforementioned suicide terrorist in-the-making.  If 
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individuals under high commitment to a focal goal are more likely to employ costly or 
extreme means in pursuit of that focal goal, then it behooves the research community to 
explore interventions that can either a) attenuate the augmentation effect, thus altering 
perceptions of a costly means as optimal for focal goal pursuit, or b) reintroduce balance 
among one’s goal activations and commitments before the individual takes that most 






Figure 1.  Perceived efficacy of means types (medications) for pursuing a focal goal 




Figure 2.  Effect of high vs. low focal goal commitment (to fighting a focal illness) on 





Figure 3.  Percentage of participants in high (vs. low) commitment condition who chose 
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Figure 4.  Structural equation model showing the effect of the commitment manipulation 
on medication (means) choice, as mediated by the perceived rationality of the c s ly 
medication. 
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Figure 5.  Perceived means extremity as a function of the relation of the alternative goal 
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